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nearly four de-
cades after it found a 
place in India’s Con-
stitutional jurispru-
dence, the question 
of “basic structure” 
is soon going to be 
settled in Pakistan. 
For months, Paki-
stan’s Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and 
the Supreme Court have wrestled with 
the issue while hearing petitions against 
the 18th Amendment, which, some have 
argued, violates the basic structure of the 
Constitution—and is, therefore, illegal. 
In the crosshairs is the new law pertain-
ing to the appointment of judges through 
a judicial commission and parliamentary 
committee. Pakistani lawyers like Aitzaz 
Ahsan think that Pakistan’s court could 
follow the precedent of its Indian coun-
terpart: upholding Parliament’s right to 
amend, not abrogate, the Constitution. 
What is the Indian precedent?
In India, the question over Parliament’s 
right to amend the Constitution began at a 
time of political turmoil. It was 1973, and 
Indian Parliament’s power to abrogate 
fundamental rights, specifically the right 
to property, came under challenge in Kesa-
vananda Bharti v. The State of Kerala and 
Others. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
impatience with Constitutional restric-
tions on her power threatened to plunge 
the country into authoritarian rule, and 
the Supreme Court, it appeared, was 
India’s last hope. A grimly divided court 
(7 to 6) concluded that Parliament’s power 
to amend or abrogate the Constitution 
was limited by what it called the docu-
ment’s “basic structure.” But the majority 
differed on what this term meant, and 
pointed to general concepts instead of spe-
cific provisions. In the judgment, Chief 
Justice S. M. Sikri cited the republican and 
democratic form of India’s Constitution, 
its secularism, federalism, and separation 
of power as facets of the basic structure—
but disagreements persist to this day.
Constitutional provisions, interpreta-
tive methodologies, and normative politi-
cal theory provide the groundwork for 
basic-structure arguments. For Pakistan’s 
Supreme Court, the 
concept is covered by 
Articles 238 and 239 of 
the Constitution. Read 
together, they state that 
the Constitution “may 
be amended by an Act 
of Parliament” and 
that “no amendment … 
shall be called in ques-
tion in any court on any 
ground whatsoever.” On 
the face of it, this is clear and simple. But 
the cumulative effect of these provisions 
turns on the lawyerly interpretation of 
what an amendment really is. Can Parlia-
ment validly delete fundamental rights, 
as India’s tried to, or are all amendments 
equally valid?
These questions are important, but so 
is the context. Two important differences 
between India and Pakistan are notewor-
thy. In 1973, India was descending into 
authoritarian chaos. In 2010, Pakistan is 
trying to recover from it. Principal ques-
tions in Kesavananda Bharti involved 
fundamental rights. Issues in Pakistan 
largely revolve around institutional ar-
rangements, like the appointment of judges.
In Pakistan, three outcomes are pos-
sible. The Supreme Court can deny the 
existence of the Constitution’s basic struc-
ture—this is highly unlikely—rendering 
all amendments as equally valid, includ-
ing those removing fundamental rights. 
Second, the court might affirm the Con-
stitution’s basic structure as inviolable, 
and suggest that the independence of the 
judiciary is a part of it, and that Article 
175-A related to the appointment of judges 
violates this independence. Here, the 
court subjects itself to a high interpreta-
tive burden—judges must show that there 
is only one right way of appointing mem-
bers of the judiciary, which the new law 
falls short of describing. 
Alternately, they must 
establish that the general 
concept of judicial inde-
pendence requires spe- 
cific appointment prac-
tices. Third, the court 
might go with the sec-
ond option but also con-
clude that Article 175-A 
is valid. Options one and 
two present absolutist 
positions, and would, in the public mind, 
separate the stakeholders into winners 
and losers. By having it both ways, option 
three gives something to both Parliament 
and the court.
By affirming the Constitution’s basic 
structure as inviolable, Pakistan’s Sup-
reme Court secures an important power 
for itself: the power to decide on the con-
stitutionality of future amendments. 
Underlying these struggles with legal (and 
political) concepts are larger questions 
about the role of the judiciary in shap-
ing representative democracy. Should 
the courts be making up for the poverty 
of a representative system? What should 
they do and how far should they go? In 
its forthcoming verdict, Pakistan’s court 
will speak the language of logic. But basic 
structure is surely more than that. The 
verdict could shape the nature, and future, 
of Pakistan’s democracy.
dam is an assistant professor at Singapore 
Management University’s School of Law.
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